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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Since many years, economists have considered health in their studies following dif-
ferent approaches, theoretical and empirical, both at macro level and at micro level.
The aspects that are analyzed throughout these chapters are the impact of longevity
- induced by a better health condition - on economic growth, the relationship be-
tween health and education in the formation of human capital and the importance
of a healthy labor force.
In the last decades, there has been a rapid improvement in individual health con-
ditions that increased the life expectancy (World Bank, 2017). Many economists
agree on the positive effect of higher life expectancy on economic growth. Lorentzen
et al. (2008) document that a lower risk of death during the first productive years is
associated with lower levels of risky behavior, lower fertility, and higher investment
in physical capital in African countries. Looking at OECD countries, Gehringer and
Prettner (2017) find, empirically and theoretically, that the decrease of mortality
positively affects technological progress and productivity growth. Still on the opti-
mistic side, but from a theoretical perspective, higher life expectancy implies higher
1
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accumulation of human capital and higher accumulation of physical capital. In par-
ticular, in the Cervellati and Sunde (2005) model, human capital is a central factor
of production and it improves the longevity and productivity of future generations.
In turn, individuals decide about human capital acquisition by taking into account
both life expectancy and the economic environment. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000)
calibrate an OLG framework in continuous time, where individuals make optimal
schooling investments according to a probability of death. Mortality decline makes
schooling and consumption increase significantly. Boucekkine et al. (2003) build a
model based on De la Croix and Licandro (1999) and Boucekkine et al. (2002), where
a realistic survival law is embedded into an endogenous growth model with vintage
human capital. This framework allows the authors to study how shifts in survival
probabilities at different ages affect the investments in human capital and promote
growth. As mentioned above, another channel that is explored at the theoretical
level is the accumulation of physical capital: i.e. a higher life expectancy creates the
incentive to save more: among others Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Chakraborty
(2004) (seminal works on OLG with endogenous survival probability), Azomahou
et al. (2009) (age dependent survival probability), Leung and Wang (2010) (savings
and health care are complements), Heijdra and Mierau (2012) (focus on the imper-
fect market annuities market).
On the other hand, there are economists who do not agree with the optimistic side:
better health condition of the population might cause faster population growth and
therefore a decrease of the growth rate of GDP per capita (Acemoglu and Johnson,
2007), due to the well-known neoclassical capital dilution effect (cf. Solow, 1956; Di-
amond, 1965). In particular, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) show empirically that
a 1% rise in life expectancy leads to a 1.7-2% increase in the population size but it
increases aggregate GDP much less. According to the simulations by Ashraf et al.
(2008), the effects of health improvements on income per capita are substantially
lower than those that are often quoted by policy-makers, suggesting that propo-
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nents of efforts to improve health conditions in developing countries should rely
on humanitarian rather than economic reasons. Moreover, exploiting the empirical
methodology of the panel Granger-causality, Hartwig (2010) does not support the
view that health capital formation fosters long-term economic growth in the OECD
area. Applying panel data analysis, Suhrcke and Urban (2010) find that cardiovas-
cular diseases are detrimental to growth just for high income countries and not for
low-middle income countries.
Concerning the relationship between education and health: ”Much of what we call
consumption constitutes investment in human capital. Direct expenditures on ed-
ucation, health, and internal migration to take advantage of better job opportu-
nities are clear examples. [...] Many of them have virtually no schooling, are in
poor health, are unskilled, and have little ability to do useful work.” (quoted from
Schultz, 1961). Especially at the empirical level, there are many examples of how
a good health status or the eradication of some particular sicknesses have affected
the level of education (Bleakley, 2007; Bleakley and Lange, 2009; Lucas, 2010; Oster
et al., 2013).
Moreover, in the literature, the relationship between health in early life and edu-
cation is highly explored (Conti et al., 2010). Perri (1984), Behrman and Rosenzweig
(2004), Currie (2009), among others, show that there is a negative effect of child-
hood low health status on educational achievements. Healthier children perform
better at school and they will have a broader health-related knowledge (Behrman,
2009). According to Case et al. (2005), intergenerational transmission of economic
status can potentially take place through the mechanism of health: individuals born
into poorer families experience poorer childhood health, lower investments in human
capital and poorer health in early adulthood, all of which are associated with lower
income in middle age, the years in which they themselves become parents. Despite
the empirical literature is wider on the relationship between health and education,
there are also some theoretical works. Exploiting the Schumpeterian mechanism,
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Howitt (2005) describes the possible channels of how health can affect human cap-
ital. Van Zon and Muysken (2001) present a model of endogenous growth where
a good health status is necessary for workers. Specifically Van Zon and Muysken
(2001) identify three ways in which health affects intertemporal decision-making:
i) health serves as the ”conditio sine qua non” to the provision of human capital
services; ii) there is competition between the provision of health services and the
provision of labor services allocated to the production of output. Besides health
competes with the time spent on human capital accumulation; iii) health might
generate positive utility on its own. According to Galama et al. (2018), the effect
of education on mortality exists in some contexts but not in others, and it seems to
depend on different factors. Strulik (2018) presents a model where individuals with
a higher return to education choose more education as well as a healthier lifestyle
and they spend less on unhealthy consumption than individuals with lower educa-
tion.
Last but not least, a healthier population usually means also a more productive
labor force: Bloom and Canning (2005) and Prettner et al. (2013) show that health
is important like education for the workers. In the Kuhn and Prettner (2016) model,
health care increases labor participation and at the same time it also diverts labor
away from production and R&D. According to Kuhn et al. (2015) a lower morbidity
is associated with higher earnings and a lower disutility from labor. In particular,
in their theoretical model the authors focus on the decision to retire according to
the individuals’ health care choices. A very similar set-up, but with different types
of health investments is the one by Dalgaard and Strulik (2017). Still on the same
approach, Galama et al. (2013) follow the Grossman (1972) model implementing the
individual choice of retirement and health care, besides consumption. Cai (2010)
estimates a panel data simultaneous equation model to examine the relationship
between health and labor force participation in Australia. His findings confirm that
health has a positive and significant effect on labor force participation for both males
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and females: a change from fair to poor health on average reduces the probability
of participation by 2.4 percentage points for males and 3.7 percentage points for fe-
males. In addition, looking at European countries, Garc´ıa-Go´mez (2011) documents
that there is a significant causal effect from health on the probability of employment.
Indeed, individuals who have a health shock are more likely to quit the job and tran-
sit into disability.
This thesis consists of two papers, one co-authored and one single-authored.
The second chapter is a co-authored paper with Professor Alberto Bucci (Univer-
sity of Milan) and Professor Klaus Prettner (University of Hohenheim, Germany):
Children’s health, human capital accumulation, and R&D-based economic growth. In
this joint work, we analyze the role of children’s health for human capital accumu-
lation and for long-run economic growth. In particular, we build an R&D-based
growth model a la Romer (1990) in which the stock of human capital of the next
generation is determined by parental education and health investments. The house-
hold side is characterized by parents living for two periods that have to invest an
amount of resources in their children’s health and education. The results show that,
on top of the usual children quality-quantity trade-off, there is also complementarity
between the two types of investment: parents who want healthy children want also
well-educated children and vice versa. The production side is characterized by five
sectors: final goods, intermediate goods, R&D sector, health care and education.
Human capital enters all sectors but the intermediate goods sector. We show that
higher investment in children’s health raises the growth rate of human capital and
therefore the growth rate of the central input in the R&D sector. It follows that
technological progress will increase, leading to higher economic growth. This type of
mechanism based on R&D-based endogenous economic growth explains the positive
effect of health on growth that is found for modern economies. Moreover, we find
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that faster population growth implies lower economic growth. Our model offers an
additional pathway by which health could exert a positive effect on economic growth
besides the neoclassical capital dilution effect and the Ben-Porath mechanism.
The third chapter is a single-authored paper: Different types of Health Expendi-
tures in an overlapping generations framework: living longer or working better? We
consider the fact that life expectancy depends on the health status and at the same
time being healthy means being more productive at work. Therefore, we combine
two strings of the existing literature about the different impacts of health: higher life
expectancy and higher worker productivity. As in the second chapter, the house-
hold side is characterized by a two periods OLG model, but the second stage of
life is uncertain, given a survival probability, depending on the health status. The
health status is a linear function of the government health expenditure. Indeed, the
government allocates its revenues, coming from a tax on the household income, be-
tween two health expenditures: the first type just mentioned above, preventive and
curative treatments -hospitals, health care personnel, drugs- and the second type
of health expenditure that makes workers more productive. The production side of
the economy is characterized by the final good production with a standard Cobb
Douglas where the inputs are capital and effective labor. The latter one is a linear
function of the second health expenditure by the government. The Eurofound1 re-
ports all the work-related health problems that prevent daily activities at work or
directly absence at work. Therefore, the government with ergonomic interventions,
better working spaces, financing medical treatments can improve the productivity of
workers. As a consequence, the government faces a trade-off allocating the resources
to make individuals live longer or to make them work better. We find the optimal
combination of the tax rate and of the allocation of the tax revenues between the
two health policies, that maximizes the steady state of GDP per worker.
1European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
CHAPTER 2
Children’s health, human capital accumulation, and
R&D-based economic growth1
1This chapter is based on the paper “Children’s health, human capital accumulation, and R&D-
based economic growth” by Annarita Baldanzi (University of Milan, University of Pavia), Alberto
Bucci (University of Milan) and Klaus Prettner (University of Hohenheim).
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Abstract
We analyze the effects of children’s health on human capital accumulation and on
long-run economic growth. For this purpose we design an R&D-based growth model
in which the stock of human capital of the next generation is determined by parental
education and health investments. We show that i) there is a complementarity
between education and health: if parents want to have better educated children, they
also raise health investments and vice versa; ii) parental health investments exert an
unambiguously positive effect on long-run economic growth, iii) faster population
growth reduces long-run economic growth. These results are consistent with the
empirical evidence for modern economies in the twentieth century.
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2.1 Introduction
There has been a substantial improvement in childhood health within all industrial-
ized countries over the last decades. According to the World Bank (2016)’s Health
Nutrition and Population Statistics, the mortality rate of children under the age of
5 has decreased in the OECD from 63 deaths per 1000 children in 1960 to 7 deaths
in 2015. This corresponds to a reduction of the child mortality rate of almost 90%
within two generations. Furthermore, over the same time span, the prevalence of
certain diseases, such as anemia, has decreased from 24% to around 15% among chil-
dren. The substantial improvements in the health condition of children are therefore
an important driver of the rise in the survival rate to the age of 65, which has in-
creased between 1960 and 2015 from 64% to 83% for men and from 75% to 90% for
women.
As far as the relationship between health and national income per head is con-
cerned, there is a strong positive association between these two variables, as reflected
in the famous “Preston Curve” (Preston, 1975). However, there are different points
of view about the “causality”: if some economists claim the positive effects of health
on income: Bloom and Canning (2000), Cervellati and Sunde (2005), and Lorentzen
et al. (2008), other economists claim the opposite: lower mortality – as induced
by a better health condition of the population – might trigger faster population
growth and therefore a reduction in the growth rate of income per capita due to the
well-known neoclassical capital dilution effect (cf. Solow, 1956; Diamond, 1965).2 In
their influential work, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) show that a 1% increase in life
expectancy leads to a 1.7-2% increase in the population size but it raises aggregate
GDP growth to a lesser extent.3 Consequently, according to their findings, a better
2For the optimistic siade, see also Gallup et al. (1999), Bhargava et al. (2001), and Gehringer
and Prettner (2017) for empirical findings and De la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2000), Boucekkine et al. (2002), Boucekkine et al. (2003), Lagerlo¨f (2003), and Bar and
Leukhina (2010) for theoretical considerations.
3For the ”pessimistic” side see also Ashraf et al. (2008); Hartwig (2010); Suhrcke and Urban
(2010)
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health condition of the population reduces income growth per capita.
Aghion et al. (2011) and Bloom et al. (2014) in turn criticize the findings of
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Their argument is that the negative effect of higher
life expectancy on economic growth might come from the omission of a measure for
the initial health condition from the regression specifications. Countries with a lower
initial health condition of the population have a larger potential to improve health,
but, at the same time, they have a lower economic growth potential. Including
initial life expectancy as a proxy for initial health in the regressions, Bloom et al.
(2014) show that there is a causal positive effect of better health on economic growth.
Furthermore, using the same panel data for the period 1940-2000 as Acemoglu and
Johnson (2007), Cervellati and Sunde (2011) find that the effect of life expectancy
on economic growth might have been negative before the demographic transition
when fertility rates stayed constant in the face of decreasing mortality, but that it is
unambiguously positive after the onset of the demographic transition when higher
life expectancy reduces the fertility rate such that population growth slows down.
This implies a positive effect of health on income per capita in a neoclassical-type
of growth model because the capital dilution effect is reduced. A complementary
effect is that increases in life expectancy raise human capital investments, which
also fosters economic growth as shown by Ben-Porath (1967); Cervellati and Sunde
(2005, 2013).
The aim of our paper is to contribute to this debate by showing another path-
way by which health has the potential to impact on long-run economic growth,
especially in modern knowledge-based economies that have already experienced the
demographic transition in the past.
Our argument is based on an endogenous growth mechanism where new ideas are
created in a research sector by the human capital that a society devotes to R&D.4
4For endogenous growth models, see Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and
Howitt (1992), Jones (1995), Kortum (1997), Peretto (1998), Segerstro¨m (1998), Young (1998),
Howitt (1999), and many others. For frameworks that explicitly model human capital as a result
of schooling investments, see, for example, Funke and Strulik (2000), Strulik (2005), Grossmann
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The aggregate human capital stock of a country is in turn a compound of the educa-
tion level and the health condition of the population and there are feedback effects
between these two variables (Schultz, 1961; Grossman, 2000; Becker, 2007). In the
theoretical literature, there are examples about the interplay between health and
education. Howitt (2005) describes six possible channels of how health can affect
growth, in particular human capital in a broader sense, in a Schumpeterian model:
i) healthier workers are more productive; ii) increases in life expectancy, because of
good health, have a positive effect on the steady-state average skill level of the popu-
lation; iii) health matters for the rate of return to education, indeed healthy children
will gain more from a given amount of education; iv) healthy childhood makes a per-
son more creative; v) healthy childhood improve the ability to cope with stress in
the adulthood, therefore to adapt to the frequently disruptive and stressful effects
of rapid technological change; vi) empirically there is a strong negative correlation
between various indicators of population health and measures of income inequal-
ity. More related to human capital is the work by Van Zon and Muysken (2001).
Lucas (1988) endogenous framework is exploited to describe the trade-off between
health and human capital accumulation: an expansion of the health sector promotes
growth thanks to the increased health of the population, while a contraction of the
health sector frees the resources necessary to increase growth through an increase in
human capital accumulation activities. In particular, Van Zon and Muysken (2001)
assume that the generation of health services is characterized by decreasing returns
and human capital accumulation is modeled with increasing returns. Prettner et al.
(2013) show that a fertility decline induces higher education and health investments
that are able to compensate for declining fertility under certain circumstances. In
Strulik (2018), individuals with a higher return to education choose more education
as well as a healthier lifestyle. In particular, a higher return to education makes in-
dividuals search more education and have a higher labor income. Since the marginal
(2007), Bucci (2008, 2013), Strulik et al. (2013), and Prettner (2014).
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return of health expenditure is declining while the marginal damage of unhealthy
consumption is increasing, educated and wealthy individuals spend not only more
on health but also less on unhealthy consumption than less educated ones. In their
empirical work, Galama et al. (2018) show that the effect of education on mortal-
ity exists in some contexts but not in others, and it seems to depend on different
factors: the gender, the labor market returns to education, the quality of education
and whether education affects the quality of individuals peers.
In our model, on the household side, health enters the utility function of parents
who choose how much to invest in children’s health and in children’s education. We
show that, if parents want to have better educated children, they also increase health
investments in their children. This result is consistent with the empirical findings
of Perri (1984), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004) and Currie (2009), who document
a negative effect of childhood ill-health on educational achievements.5 In addition,
healthier children perform better in school and will themselves have a higher health-
related knowledge (Behrman, 2009). Overall, in our framework, human capital is
used as an input in the production functions of the final goods sector, the R&D
sector, the education sector, and the health sector. Given the positive role of health
in the creation of human capital, there are more productive resources available for
R&D in a healthier economy and this has the potential to lead to faster long-run
economic growth (cf. Prettner et al., 2013; Kuhn and Prettner, 2016). Our model
therefore characterizes an additional channel by which health could exert a positive
effect on economic growth besides the neoclassical capital dilution effect (Cervellati
and Sunde, 2011) and the Ben-Porath mechanism (Ben-Porath, 1967; Cervellati and
Sunde, 2005, 2013).
The paper is organized as follows. We set up the model in Section 2.2, describe
the consumption side, the production side, and the market clearing conditions. Sec-
tion 2.3 contains the balanced growth path of the economy and the main analytical
5See also Bleakley (2007), Bleakley and Lange (2009), Lucas (2010), and Oster et al. (2013)
who document a positive effect of health on human capital.
CHAPTER 2. 13
results. We then proceed to a numerical example to illustrate the transitional dy-
namics of the system. In Section 2.5.2 we conclude.
2.2 The model
Consider a knowledge-based economy a la Romer (1990) - Jones (1995) with five sec-
tors: final goods production, intermediate goods production, R&D, education, and
health. Physical capital and human capital are the two production factors. Physical
capital is accumulated according to the savings and investment decisions of house-
holds and it is used to produce machines in the intermediate goods sector. Human
capital is available in four different forms: as “workers” in the final goods sector for
the production of the consumption aggregate, as “teachers” in the education sector
for the production of the knowledge and skills of the next generation, as “health care
personnel” for the improvement of the health condition of the next generation in
the health sector (including also public health projects, for example, improvements
in sanitation), and as “scientists” for the production of new blueprints for machines
in the R&D sector.
The consumption side of the economy consists of overlapping generations of
households who live for two time periods. Households consume, save, and choose
the number of children on the one hand, and how much to invest in education
and health of each child, on the other hand. The households’ expenditures on
education are used to hire the teachers to educate the young, while the households’
expenditures on health are used to hire the health care personnel to improve the
physical well-being of children.6
6There is a vast literature in which overlapping generation models are employed to endogenize
life expectancy (Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; Chakraborty, 2004; Cervellati and Sunde, 2005;
Hashimoto and Tabata, 2005; Bhattacharya and Qiao, 2007; Castello´-Climent and Dome´nech,
2008; Osang and Sarkar, 2008; De la Croix and Licandro, 2013). Our work abstracts from the
survival probability; instead we follow a short-cut formulation in which the health component is
one of the determinants of the accumulation of human capital.
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2.2.1 Households
We follow Strulik et al. (2013) and Prettner et al. (2013) in assuming that the utility
function of households is given by
ut = log (c1,t) + β log (Rt+1st) + ξ log (nt) + θ log (et) + ζ log (ft) ,
where c1,t is first period consumption of the generation born at time t, Rt+1 is the
capital rental rate, st denotes savings such that c2,t = Rt+1st refers to consumption
in the second period of life, nt is the number of children, et refers to education
investments per child, ft refers to health investments per child, β is the discount
factor, ξ denotes the utility weight of children, θ refers to the utility weight of
children’s eduction, and ζ is the utility weight of children’s health.7 For consistency,
we employ the parameter restriction ξ > θ + ζ, which ensures that parents do
not want to invest in children’s education and health without having children in
the first place. In addition, the restriction rules out immediate extinction (i.e.,
nt = 0). The utility function without the health component of children is frequently
used in the literature (cf. Strulik et al., 2013; Prettner et al., 2013; Bloom et al.,
2015b) because it operationalizes the “warm-glow motive of giving” as described
by Andreoni (1989) and because it is the special case of logarithmic utility of the
more general specification employed by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor (2011). To
see this, consider the formulation of Galor and Weil (2000), where parental utility
depends positively on the consumption possibilities of children as approximated by
their total income ntht+1wt+1 with wt+1 being the wage rate per unit of human
capital of the next generation. Computing the logarithm yields log(nt)+log(ht+1)+
log(wt+1), where the wage rate per unit of human capital of the next generation
is a constant to the parent such that it drops out of the first-order conditions. If
7As in Strulik et al. (2013), each single sex household consists of one parent, to avoid matching
problems.
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ht+1 is a multiplicative function of education and health, then our corresponding
formulation in the utility function as represented by ξ log (nt) + θ log (et) + ζ log (ft)
captures all the tradeoffs that parents face when deciding on the number of children
and the parental expenditures for children’s education and health.
The budget constraint of the household is given by
(1− ψnt)htwt = ηetnt + κntft + c1,t + st,
where ψ measures the unit time cost of rearing each child -ψnt is the opportunity
cost of rising children, η measures the unit cost of the investment in education per
child, κ measures the unit cost of the investment in health per child, ht refers to the
human capital level of an adult, which is tantamount to her productivity and is itself
a compound determined by the education and health investments of her own parents,
and wt is the wage rate per unit of human capital of the parent generation. Note
that, while η and κ are constant, the investment costs in education and health are
also determined by the wages of teachers and of health care personnel and therefore
depend on the overall stage of economic development.
The result of the optimization problem is given by optimal consumption, savings,
fertility, education investments, and health investments as given by
c1,t =
htwt
1 + β + ξ
, (2.1)
st =
βhtwt
1 + β + ξ
, (2.2)
nt =
ξ − ζ − θ
ψ (1 + β + ξ)
, (2.3)
et =
θψhtwt
η (ξ − ζ − θ) , (2.4)
ft =
ζψhtwt
κ (ξ − ζ − θ) . (2.5)
At this stage we can state the following intermediate result that is consistent
with the empirical findings discussed in the introduction.
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Proposition 1.
i) If households have stronger preferences for a higher number of children, the
optimal fertility rate is higher, while optimal consumption, savings, and in-
vestments in children’s health and education are lower;
ii) If households have stronger preferences for children’s education, parental op-
timal investments in both education and health are higher, while fertility is
lower;
iii) If households have stronger preferences for children’s health, parental optimal
investments in both education and health are higher, while fertility is lower.
Proof. Part i): By investigating Equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.4), and (2.5) it is straight-
forward that a higher level of ξ implies lower consumption, savings, children’s health,
and children’s education. To see the effect on fertility, we compute the derivative of
(2.3) with respect to ξ:
∂nt
∂ξ
=
1 + β + ζ + θ
(1 + β + ξ)2 ψ
and observe that the derivative is unambiguously positive.
Part ii): By investigating Equations (2.3) and (2.5), fertility decreases and chil-
dren’s health increases with θ. To see the effect on children’s education, we compute
the derivative of (2.4) with respect to θ:
∂et
∂θ
=
(ξ − ζ)ψhtwt
η (ξ − θ − ζ)2 .
Since we have that ξ > θ + ζ, the derivative is unambiguously positive.
Part iii): By investigating Equations (2.3) and (2.4), fertility decreases and chil-
dren’s education increases with ζ. To see the effect on children’s education, we
compute the derivative of (2.5) with respect to ζ:
∂ft
∂ζ
=
(ξ − θ)ψhtwt
κ (ξ − θ − ζ)2 .
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Again, given ξ > θ + ζ, this derivative is unambiguously positive.
Altogether, we observe that parents who invest more in their children’s education
also invest more in their children’s health and vice versa. At the same time, higher
investments in education and health imply that parents have fewer children. This
is consistent with the evidence on the relation between health and education (cf.
Perri, 1984; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Currie, 2009; Behrman, 2009; Case
et al., 2005) and it is also consistent with the child quality-quantity trade-off as
described by Becker and Lewis (1973).8
Taking into account Equation (2.3), the evolution of the population size is gov-
erned by the difference equation
Nt+1 = ntNt =
ξ − ζ − θ
ψ (1 + β + ξ)
Nt (2.6)
and the optimal labor force participation rate can be calculated as
lpr = 1− ψnt = 1 + β + ζ + θ
1 + β + ξ
.
Naturally, the labor force participation rate is smaller than one because of the time
parents spend on rearing children.
2.2.2 Production
The productions side of the economy consists of five sectors: final goods production,
intermediate goods production, R&D, education, and health. The description of the
first three sectors follows the standard R&D-based growth literature with the only
difference being that human capital (as a compound of the number of people, their
education level and their health condition) is used instead of raw labor as a factor of
8It is noteworthy that ξ has two effects of opposing signs on nt but the positive one prevails,
while there are no multiple effects of opposing signs as regards the impact of θ on et and of ζ on
ft.
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production. An example of how the health care sector enters the economic growth
framework is by Kuhn and Prettner (2016), that model an economy with four sec-
tors: final goods production, intermediate goods production, R&D, and health care.
There are two productive factors that can be used in these four sectors: capital and
labor. The latter one is in the form of workers. Besides, Schneider and Winkler
(2017) model the health sector but in a decentralized overlapping generations econ-
omy with a focus on the annuities.
The final goods sector produces a consumption good Yt with human capital Ht =
htNt and machines xt,i as inputs according to the production function
Yt = H
1−α
t,Y
∫ A
0
xαt,i di, (2.7)
where A is the technological frontier and α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the elasticity of output
with respect to machines of type i. Profit maximization implies
wt = (1− α) Yt
Ht,Y
, pt,i = αH
1−α
t,Y x
α−1
t,i , (2.8)
where pt,i is the price of machines.
The intermediate goods sector is monopolistically competitive as in Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). Firms in the intermediate goods sector have access to the production
technology xt,i = kt,i, where kt,i denotes physical capital employed by each firm.
Operating profits of intermediate goods producers are then given by pit,i = pt,ixt,i −
Rtkt,i = αH
1−α
t,Y k
α
t,i−Rtkt,i, such that profit maximization yields the optimal price of
a machine as pt,i = Rt/α for all i. In this context, 1/α is the markup over marginal
cost. Due to symmetry with respect to the pricing policy of individual firms, we
know that the aggregate capital stock is Kt = Atkt such that we can write the
aggregate production function as
Yt = (AHt,Y )
1−αKαt . (2.9)
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The R&D sector employs scientists Ht,A to discover new blueprints At according
to the production technology
At+1 − At = δAφtHt,A, (2.10)
where δ refers to the productivity of scientists and φ < 1 to the intertempo-
ral spillover effects of technologies that raise the productivity of human capital
employed in the research sector (cf. Jones, 1995). R&D firms maximize profits
pit,A = pt,AδA
φ
tHt,A−wt,AHt,A, with pt,A being the price of a blueprint that they sell
to the intermediate goods producers. From the first-order condition we get
wt,A = pt,AδA
φ
t , (2.11)
where wt,A refers to the wage rate per unit of human capital of scientists. The
interpretation of this equation is straightforward: wages of scientists increase with
their productivity as measured by δAφt and with the price that a research firm can
charge for the blueprints that it sells to the intermediate goods producers. In the
labor market there is free entry and this assumption allows us to exploit the wages
paid in the final goods sector to compute the wages in the other sectors. In particu-
lar, the education sector employs teachers with human capital Ht,E to produce the
knowledge and skills of the next generation.9 Employment in the education sector
is determined by the equilibrium condition that household expenditures for teachers
are equal to the total wage bill of teachers, i.e.,
ηetntNt = Ht,Ewt ⇔ Ht,E = θHt
1 + β + ξ
.
Similarly, the health sector employs health care personnel with human capital Ht,F
9Berk and Weil (2015) underline the problem of older teachers in this context: with the phe-
nomenon of population aging, workers will have older teachers, who might teach outdated knowl-
edge. This observation is very interesting and it could be considered in an extension of our model
that allows for this type of the “vintage effect”.
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to improve the health condition of the next generation. Employment in the health
sector is therefore determined by the equilibrium condition that household expen-
ditures for health are equal to the total wage bill of health care personnel, i.e.,
κftntNt = Ht,Fwt ⇔ Ht,F = ζHt
1 + β + ξ
.
Individual human capital is a Cobb-Douglas compound of the education level and
the health condition such that
ht+1 =
(
µ
Ht,E
Nt+1
)ν (
ω
Ht,F
Nt+1
)1−ν
(2.12)
where Ht,E/Nt+1 measures the education intensity per child, µ is the productivity in
the schooling sector, Ht,F/Nt+1 measures the health care intensity, ω is the produc-
tivity in the health care sector, and ν denotes the elasticity of human capital with
respect to education.10
2.2.3 Market clearing
Labor markets are assumed to clear such that lpr∗Nt = Lt = Lt,Y +Lt,A+Lt,E+Lt,F ,
where Lt is total employment and Lt,j for j = Y,A,E, F refers to employment in
the four different sectors that use human capital. This implies that lpr ∗ Ht =
Ht,Y + Ht,A + Ht,E + Ht,F because human capital is embodied. Since there is free
movement of labor in the economy, wages in the final goods sector and in the R&D
sector will be equal in equilibrium. Inserting (2.8) into (2.11) therefore yields the
following equilibrium condition that equates the marginal value product of a worker
in the final goods sector and of a scientist in the R&D sector
pt,AδA
φ
t = (1− α)
Yt
Ht,Y
. (2.13)
10This function will generate ht+1/ht > 1 given sufficiently large productivity in education and
health, i.e. µ and ω.
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We follow Aghion and Howitt (2005) and assume that patent protection lasts for
one generation, which is reasonably in line with the duration of patents in reality
(cf. The German Patent and Trade Mark Office, 2016; The United States Patent
and Trademark Office, 2012). After a patent expires, the right to sell the blueprint
is handed over to the government that consumes the associated proceeds.11 As a
consequence, the patent price is given by the one-period profits of the intermediate
goods sector, which can be written as
pit,i = pt,A = (1− α)αkαt H1−αt,Y =
(
α− α2) Yt
At
.
Plugging this into (2.13) and solving for employment of human capital used in the
final goods sector yields Ht,Y = A
1−φ
t /(αδ). Now we can use the relation Ht,A =
lpr∗Ht−Ht,Y −Ht,E−Ht,F , which is implied by the labor market clearing condition
and the fact that human capital is embodied, to solve for human capital employment
in the R&D sector as
Ht,A =
1 + β + ζ + θ
1 + β + ξ
Ht − A
1−φ
t
αδ
− θHt
1 + β + ξ
− ζHt
1 + β + ξ
.
Since Ht = htNt, we obtain
12
Ht,A =
(1 + β)htNt
1 + β + ξ
− A
1−φ
t
αδ
. (2.14)
Plugging the resulting employment level of human capital of scientists into the pro-
duction function of the R&D sector [Equation (2.10)], yields the following law of
motion for blueprints
At+1 =
(1 + β) δhtNtA
φ
t
1 + β + ξ
− (1− α)At
α
. (2.15)
11For the long-run balanced growth rate of the economy it would make no difference if the
government were allowed to invest part of (or even the total) of these proceeds.
12It is noteworthy that Ht,A = max [0, Eq(2.14)].
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We immediately see that, ceteris paribus, a higher productivity of scientists (δ), a
higher employment level of human capital in the R&D sector [Ht,A as defined in
Equation (2.14)], and stronger intertemporal knowledge spillovers (φ) all lead to a
faster accumulation of patents between time t and t+ 1.
Capital market clearing requires that total savings stNt are either used for invest-
ment in physical capital, Kt+1, or for buying newly developed blueprints to establish
an intermediate goods producer. Given that the price of a patent is pt,A, the value
of savings in the form of new patents amounts to pt,A (At+1 − At). Thus, the stock
of physical capital at time t+ 1 is equal to aggregate savings net of savings invested
in the shares of intermediate goods producers such that
Kt+1 = stNt − pt,A (At+1 − At) = Yt − c1,tNt − c2,t−1 Nt
nt−1
−Gt, (2.16)
where Gt are governmental expenditures financed by the proceeds of expired patents
and the second equality follows from the national accounts identity Yt = Ct+Kt+1 +
Gt for a closed economy with Ct = c1,tNt − c2,t−1 Ntnt−1 being aggregate consumption.
Note that, in this expression, c2,t−1Nt/nt−1 refers to total consumption of the gen-
eration born at time t − 1, which is in the second phase of its life cycle in year
t and is of size Nt/nt−1. Consequently, we have total output net of consumption
expenditures by households and the government, i.e., total investment in terms of
physical capital, on the right-hand side of Eq. (2.16).
Kt+1 = (1− α)Kαt
(
A2−φt
αδ
)1−α
−
(1− α)AthtNtKαt
(
A2−φt
αδ
)−α
1 + β + ξ
. (2.17)
Finally, we solve for the evolution of individual human capital as determined by
parental investments in education and health. Plugging Ht,E and Ht,F , which result
from the household maximization problem, into the production function of human
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capital [Equation (2.12)], and also considering Eq. (2.6) yields
ht+1 =
(θµ)ν (ζω)1−ν ψ
ξ − ζ − θ ht. (2.18)
Note that, ceteris paribus, if parents have stronger preferences towards children’s ed-
ucation (higher θ) or if parents have stronger preferences towards children’s health
(higher ζ), individual human capital accumulation increases. By contrast, if par-
ents prefer having more children (higher ξ), individual human capital accumulation
decreases because of the quality-quantity trade-off. The main question that arises re-
garding aggregate human capital accumulation is whether the increase in individual
human capital accumulation due to a stronger preference for children’s health and
education can overcompensate the associated reduction in the population growth
rate.13
2.3 Dynamics and long-run equilibrium
We summarize the model dynamics defined by (2.6), (2.15), (2.17), and (2.18) in
the following four-dimensional system of difference equations:
At+1 =
(1 + β)δhtNtA
φ
t
1 + β + ξ
− (1− α)At
α
, (2.19)
Kt+1 = (1− α)Kαt
(
A2−φt
αδ
)1−α
−
(1− α)AthtNtKαt
(
A2−φt
αδ
)−α
1 + β + ξ
, (2.20)
Nt+1 =
ξ − ζ − θ
ψ(1 + β + ξ)
Nt, (2.21)
ht+1 =
(θµ)νψ(ζω)1−ν
ξ − ζ − θ ht. (2.22)
13It is noteworthy that a higher value of θ or ζ decreases the growth rate of the population, Eq.
(2.6).
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It follows that the variables A, N , and h grow at the following rates:
gA =
(1 + β) δhtNtA
φ−1
t
1 + β + ξ
− 1
α
, (2.23)
gN =
ξ − ζ − θ
ψ (1 + β + ξ)
− 1, (2.24)
gh =
(θµ)ν ψ (ζω)1−ν
ξ − ζ − θ − 1. (2.25)
It is obvious from Equation (2.23) that a balanced growth path – along which the
growth rate of technology stays constant – has to fulfill
ht
ht−1
Nt
Nt−1
(
At
At−1
)φ−1
= 1.
From this we can infer the long-run growth rate of technology as
g∗A = [(1 + gh) (1 + gN)]
1
1−φ − 1 =
[
ζ (θµ)ν ω (ζω)−ν
1 + β + ξ
] 1
1−φ
− 1.
From this result and Equation (2.9) we know that the long-run growth rate of per
capita GDP that is associated with a constant capital-to-output ratio is given by
g∗y = [(1 + gh) (1 + gA)]− 1 =
(1 + β + ξ)ψ
[
ζ(θµ)νω(ζω)−ν
1+β+ξ
]1+ 1
1−φ
ξ − ζ − θ − 1, (2.26)
while the growth rates of aggregate GDP and aggregate physical capital are
g∗Y = g
∗
K = (1 + gN) (1 + gh) (1 + gA)− 1 =
[
ζ (θµ)ν ω (ζω)−ν
1 + β + ξ
]1+ 1
1−φ
− 1.
Next, we state our central results regarding the differential evolution of fertility,
education, and health and their corresponding effects on long-run economic growth.
Proposition 2. Shifts in the population growth rate due to changes in preferences
towards fertility are accompanied by shifts in the long-run economic growth rate of
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opposing sign.
Proof. The derivative of Equation (2.26) with respect to ξ is
∂g∗y
∂ξ
=
[ζ + θ + ξ (φ− 2) + β (φ− 1) + φ− 1]ψ
[
ζ(θµ)νω(ζω)−ν
1+β+ξ
]1+ 1
1−φ
(ζ + θ − ξ)2 (1− φ) .
It is noteworthy to remind that ∂n/∂ξ > 0. Recalling that the parameter restriction
ξ > ζ+θ has to hold to rule out immediate extinction and noting that the term φ−2 is
smaller than−1 because φ < 1, we see that the numerator of this expression is always
negative. Since the denominator is always positive, the proof of the proposition is
established.
The intuition for this finding is that parents who prefer to have fewer children,
reduce fertility. This allows them – for a given income level – to spend more on
education and health for each child. In addition, the reduction in fertility allows
parents to supply more time on the labor market such that their disposable incomes
rise. Part of this additional income is spent on education and health. While the
reduction in fertility reduces the growth rate of the aggregate human capital stock,
the increase in educational investments and health investments raises growth of ag-
gregate human capital. Since the fall in fertility unleashes additional resources that
can be spent on education and health, this effect is so strong that it overcompensates
the negative effect of the reduction in fertility. Consequently, aggregate human cap-
ital accumulates faster and economic growth increases in case of lower fertility. This
is a similar mechanism as in the partial equilibrium framework of Prettner et al.
(2013) and Strulik et al. (2013). The implied negative association between fertility
and long-run economic growth is consistent with the empirical evidence for modern
economies (see, for example, Brander and Dowrick, 1994; Ahituv, 2001; Herzer et al.,
2012).
Next, we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 3. Shifts in parental education investments due to changes in prefer-
ences are accompanied by shifts in the long-run economic growth rate of the same
sign.
Proof. Taking the derivative of Equation (2.26) with respect to θ provides
∂g∗y
∂θ
=
(β + ξ + 1) {θ [ν (φ− 2)− φ+ 1] + ν (ζ − ξ) (φ− 2)}ψ
[
ζ(θµ)νω(ζω)−ν
1+β+ξ
]1+ 1
1−φ
θ (ζ + θ − ξ)2 (1− φ) .
It is noteworthy to remind that ∂e/∂θ > 0. To see that this expression is positive, we
note that the denominator is always positive. Furthermore, we inspect the following
part of the numerator: θ [ν (φ− 2) + 1] + ν (ζ − ξ) (φ− 2) = θν (φ− 2) − θφ +
θ + ν (ζ − ξ) (φ− 2). This is unambiguously positive because i) ν (ζ − ξ) (φ− 2) is
positive, ii) | θν (φ− 2) |<| ν (ζ − ξ) (φ− 2) | since ξ > ζ + θ, and iii) −θφ + θ is
positive.
The intuition behind this result is that parents who want to have better educated
children do not only increase their educational investments but they also reduce
fertility (∂n/∂θ < 0) due to the quality-quantity substitution described in Becker
and Lewis (1973). This implies in turn that they supply more of their time on the
labor market and partly spend the additional income on education and health of
their children. The additional investments in the quality of children are larger than
the reductions in the investments in their quantity. Consequently, aggregate human
capital growth increases, despite the fact that population growth decreases. Due
to this increase in the rate of aggregate human capital accumulation, technological
progress and economic growth gain momentum.
Finally, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. Shifts in parental health investments due to changes in preferences
are accompanied by shifts in the long-run economic growth rate of the same sign.
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Proof. The derivative of Equation (2.26) with respect to ζ is given by
∂g∗y
∂ζ
=
(β + ξ + 1) {ζ [ν (φ− 2) + 1] + (ν − 1) (θ − ξ) (φ− 2)}ψ
[
ζ(θµ)νω(ζω)−ν
1+β+ξ
]1+ 1
1−φ
ζ (ζ + θ − ξ)2 (φ− 1) .
Again, it is noteworthy to remind that ∂f/∂ζ > 0. To see that this expression is
positive, first note that the denominator is negative. Next, we inspect the following
part of the numerator: ζ [ν (φ− 2) + 1] + (ν − 1) (θ − ξ) (φ− 2) = ζ + ζν (φ− 2) +
(ν − 1) (θ − ξ) (φ− 2). This expression is negative because ξ > ζ + θ, which implies
that the derivative is positive.
The intuition behind this result is similar to that of Proposition 3 and it is again
rooted in the quality-quantity substitution. Parents who want to have healthier
children do not only increase their health investments but they also reduce fertility
(∂n/∂ζ < 0). Again, this allows them to work more and spend part of the additional
income on education and health of their children. Analogous to the intuition behind
the previous result, this leads to faster human capital accumulation, technological
progress, and economic growth.
2.3.1 Numerical illustration
Table 2.1: Parameter values for simulation
Parameter Value Parameter Value
β 0.6 δ 7
φ 0.7 α 0.33
ξ 0.85 ζ 0.3
θ 0.4 ψ 0.05
µ 8.68 ω 8.65
ν 0.5
We illustrate the transitional dynamics of the model and the long-run solution
by solving the four-dimensional system of difference equations (2.19)-(2.22) for the
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parameter values displayed in Table 2.1. The discount factor β is computed based
on a discount rate ρ that is equal to 2% (Zhuang et al., 2007) and considering that
each period lasts for 25 years in our OLG structure. The elasticity of output with
respect to physical capital, α, and the knowledge spillover, φ, attain the values of
0.33 and 0.7, respectively (Acemoglu, 2009; Jones, 1995; Jones and Williams, 2000;
Mankiw et al., 1992). The other parameters are chosen such that we obtain values
of the growth rate of per capita GDP and the growth rate of the population along
the balanced growth path that are consistent with the US experience averaged over
the years 2006-2015 according to the World Bank (2016) data. We consider the
growth rates of the population and of GDP per capita from 2006 to 2015 for which
we compute the geometric mean. Afterwards, we convert the yearly growth rates
into their intergenerational counterparts.14
Figure 2.1 displays the convergence of the economic growth rate from above to
its steady-state level. The dashed line represents the baseline case. We observe that
the long-run growth rate of per capita GDP almost reaches the intergenerational
growth rate of per capita GDP of the US, which is 14.59%. The growth rate of
the population is constant [see Equation (2.24)] and in our simulations we obtain
a value of 22.45% which is a reasonable approximation of the US intergenerational
population growth rate of 23.26%.
After the fifth period in the simulations, we increase the value of the weight of
children’s health in the parental utility function (ζ) by 1% in an alternative scenario
(ζ = 0.303). We observe that, after the increase in the parameter ζ, the growth rate
of GDP per capita is higher. This is exactly what we stated in Proposition 4. The
same result can be observed in Figure 2.2, where we plot the levels of technology.
After the increase in the utility weight of children’s health, technology levels are
14In particular, ξ, θ, η and ψ are chosen to get the intergenerational growth rate of population.
It was the more convenient to stick because of the data and because of the dynamics of population
(see Equation 19). The parameters ξ, θ, η are really sensitive because they show up in equations 19
and 20 with opposite sign, one at the numerator and the other one at the denominator. Therefore,
we had to pay attention to not get negative numbers.
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higher.
Figure 2.1: Growth rate of GDP per capita. Note that, after the fifth period in the
simulations, the weight of health in parental utility (ζ) increases by 1%.
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Figure 2.2: Technology level over 15 periods. Note that, after the fifth period in the
simulations, the weight of health in parental utility (ζ) increases by 1%.
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2.4 Conclusions
We set up a framework of R&D-based economic growth in which the stock of human
capital is determined by parental education and health investments. Due to the
quality-quantity trade-off, an increase in fertility leads to a reduction in education
and health investments to the extent that the growth rate of overall human capital
slows down. The converse holds true for falling fertility. Altogether, this generates a
pattern in which a lower population growth rate is associated with faster economic
growth. This pattern is consistent with the empirical findings for modern economies
in the second half of the twentieth century (Brander and Dowrick, 1994; Ahituv,
2001; Herzer et al., 2012). If parents prefer to have better educated children, they do
not only increase educational investments but also health investments and if parents
put more weight on their children’s health they do not only raise health investments
but also educational investments. This implies that there is a complementarity
between health and education as emphasized in the literature.
In our model, a better health condition of children raises the growth rate of
human capital and therefore the growth rate of the central input in the R&D sector.
As a consequence, technological progress increases, which in turn raises economic
growth. This provides a mechanism based on R&D-based endogenous economic
growth to explain the positive effect of health on growth that is found for modern
economies (Cervellati and Sunde, 2011). This mechanism is likely to complement the
ones that are based on the neoclassical capital dilution effect (Cervellati and Sunde,
2011) and on the Ben-Porath mechanism that a higher life expectancy implies a
stronger incentive for education (Ben-Porath, 1967; Cervellati and Sunde, 2005,
2013).
To focus on the most important transmission channels of the effects of children’s
health on economic growth, we abstracted from some aspects that would be present
in a more realistic setting but which would make the model more complicated such
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that analytical closed-form solutions for the long-run growth rates could not be ob-
tained. For example, i) health might not only be represented by physical well-being
but also by longevity, ii) the function by which health and education investments
translate into human capital might have a more general form than the currently used
Cobb-Douglas specification. While we do not find any reason to believe that gener-
alizations along these lines would render our central results invalid, a consideration
of these factors is surely a promising avenue for further research.
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Derivation of Equation (2.17)
Equation (2.16) comes from
Kt+1 = stNt − pii,t (At+1 − At) + τ lt,
and
Kt+1 = Yt − c1,tNt − c2,t−1Nt/nt−1 − (1− τ)lt
where lt indicates the proceeds of the patents. We assume that τ is equal to 0,
meaning that the government consumes all of the proceeds. We solve by lt and we
obtain the Equation (2.17).
2.5.2 Robustness checks
We suppose that the government does not intervene and the proceeds are spent
unproductively on public consumption (Strulik et al., 2013). This will imply that
Kt+1 = stNt. Therefore:
Kt+1 =
(1− α) βAthtNtKαt
(
A2−φt
αδ
)−α
1 + β + ξ
.
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The other three difference equations do not change:
At+1 =
(1 + β)δhtNtA
φ
t
1 + β + ξ
− (1− α)At
α
,
Nt+1 =
ξ − ζ − θ
ψ(1 + β + ξ)
Nt,
ht+1 =
(θµ)νψ(ζω)1−ν
ξ − ζ − θ ht.
The growth rates at the BGP are still the same.
g∗A = [(1 + gh) (1 + gN)]
1
1−φ − 1 =
[
ζ (θµ)ν ω (ζω)−ν
1 + β + ξ
] 1
1−φ
− 1.
g∗y = [(1 + gh) (1 + gA)]− 1 =
(1 + β + ξ)ψ
[
ζ(θµ)νω(ζω)−ν
1+β+ξ
]1+ 1
1−φ
ξ − ζ − θ − 1,
g∗Y = g
∗
K = (1 + gN) (1 + gh) (1 + gA)− 1 =
[
ζ (θµ)ν ω (ζω)−ν
1 + β + ξ
]1+ 1
1−φ
− 1.
Exploiting the iterations from Matlab, we get the final values of gN , gh and gA and
we observe that the value of g∗K is the one reached by the dynamics of the physical
capital. The same holds for technology and GDP per capita (See Fig. 2.2 and Fig.
2.3)
g∗K = (1 + gN) (1 + gh) (1 + gA)−1 = (1 + 0.2245) (1 + 0.0005465) (1 + 0.9678)−1 = 1.4108,
g∗A = [(1 + gh) (1 + gN)]
1
1−φ − 1 = [(1 + 0.0005465) (1 + 0.2245)] 11−0.7 − 1 = 0.9678,
g∗y = [(1 + gh) (1 + gA)]− 1 = 0.9688.
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Figure 2.3: Transitional dynamics of technology and physical capital growth rates
Figure 2.4: Transitional dynamics of the GDP per capita growth rate.
CHAPTER 3
Different Types of Health Expenditures in an OLG framework:
living longer or working better?1
1This chapter is based on the paper “Different Types of Health Expenditures in an OLG frame-
work:living longer or working better?” by Annarita Baldanzi (University of Milan, University of
Pavia)
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Abstract
The health status of individuals affects their longevity and their labor productivity.
We include public health expenditures into an overlapping-generations model. The
government faces the trade-off investing its revenues either into the health expen-
diture that makes the labor force productive, or into the health expenditure that
increases life expectancy. We show how the government optimally allocates the re-
sources between the two types of health expenditures. The results are remarkable
because by using a straightforward structure of the economy, we are able to com-
bine two strings of the existing literature about the impacts of health: higher life
expectancy and higher worker productivity.
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”The demographic challenge of an aging population and the increasing diversity
of working life have led to an increased focus on the concept of sustainable work
over the life course. This emphasizes the relevance of the quality of a worker’s job
and their working environment over the entire course of their working life. Work-
ing longer implies working better by ensuring work organization and working ar-
rangements that suit individual needs; training and skills development; maintaining
health, safety and well-being at the workplace; providing adequate earnings and
prospects; and paying attention to working time and worklife balance.”(Eurofound,
2017).
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3.1 Introduction
Between now and 2030, all countries will experience population aging. During the
past six decades, countries have experienced just a small increase in the share of
people aged 60 years and older, from 8% to 10%. However, in the next four decades,
this share will rise to 22% of the total population, i.e. a jump from 800 million to
2 billion people (Bloom et al., 2015a).2 According to World Bank (2017) data, in
the European Union in 2016 the percentage of population aged 65 and above was
almost 20%.
The increase in the life expectancy is an indirect evidence of the fact that there
has been a remarkable improvement in health conditions and health investments
among almost all countries in the world over the last decades (see Figure 3.1).
There is a wide literature on the positive effects of life expectancy on income. For
empirical findings see for example: Bloom and Canning (2000), Lorentzen et al.
(2008), and Gehringer and Prettner (2017). From the theoretical perspective: living
longer increases the incentives to invest not only in human capital (Cervellati and
Sunde, 2005), but also in physical capital as long as it creates a need of saving
more for retirement (Azomahou et al., 2009; Heijdra and Mierau, 2012).3 One of
the main consequence of population aging is a higher working life expectancy: in
Europe many countries have increased the official retirement age and measures to
promote higher economic activity among the workers aged 50 and older to avoid
substantial financial burdens with the public pension system.4
Improving the working conditions is a collective concern, prompted by both hu-
2Population aging can be considered a recent phenomenon, indeed mortality declines have not
improved uniformly across age groups over the last two centuries: first we have observed infants
and children mortality declines, now mortality declines characterize older ages (Lee, 1994; Wilmoth
and Horiuchi, 1999; Cutler et al., 2006).
3For other theoretical works, see also: De la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
(2000), Boucekkine et al. (2002), Boucekkine et al. (2003), Lagerlo¨f (2003), Echevarr´ıa and Iza
(2006), Ferreira and de Abreu Pessoˆa (2007), Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) and Bar and
Leukhina (2010).
4Increases in working life expectancy are more pronounced among women than men and differ-
ences according to the level of education are substantial (Loichinger and Weber, 2016).
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Figure 3.1: World Average of Life Expectancy and Health Expenditure (1995 - 2004)
(World Bank, 2018)
manitarian and economic considerations. As pointed out by the Eurofound (2017),
since the population works longer, the health, the safety and the well-being at the
workplace are even more important. Creating more jobs and jobs of better quality is
one of the targets of the EU social policy: a safe and healthy working environment
is essential for the quality of work. In general, health status is fundamental for the
labor supply: Cai (2010) finds that a change from fair to poor health on average re-
duces the probability of labor participation for both males and females.5 According
to Eurostat (2017a), a work-related health problem covers all diseases, disabilities
and other physical or mental health problems, apart from accidental injuries, suf-
fered by the person during the last 12 months, and caused or made worse by the
work. In the Labor Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc module 2013, people aged 15 to 64
years that work or worked previously are asked whether they suffered from health
problems caused or made worse by their job in the past 12 months. In total, 7.9%
have a work-related health problem. Table 3.1 shows the most common work-related
5See also Campolieti (2002), Cai and Kalb (2006), Garc´ıa-Go´mez (2011), Cai et al. (2014).
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health problems. In addition, the LFS ad hoc module 2013 assesses the extent in
which these health problems limit the ability to carry out normal day activities
either at work or outside of work. Among employees with work-related health prob-
lems, 25.3% have no limitations, 50% have some limited limitations and 22.3% have
considerable limitations in the daily activities.6 These types of work-related health
problems impact on the workers’ productivity who cannot perform their tasks and
have to ask for sick leave: among employees aged 35-54 with work-related health
problems, 47% report sick leave, while among workers with work-related health
problems that are between 55 and 64, 49.8% report sick leave.
Table 3.1: Types of work-related health problems (Eurostat, 2017a)
Type of work-related health problem Percentage of employees
Muskolo-skeletal disorders 60.1
Stress, depression, anxiety 15.9
Headache and/or eyestrain 4.8
Cardiovascular disease 4.5
Pulmonary disorders 3.6
Stomach, liver, kidney or digestive problem 1.8
Skin problem 1.2
Hearing problem 1.1
Infectious Disease 1.0
Other not elsewhere mentioned 5.4
Nowadays, another most politically debated issue is the high level of health
expenditures. It has been estimated that global spending on health care per person
will more than double by 2040 (Ahmad Kiadaliri, 2017).
At the European level (EU-28), general government health expenditure has in-
creased relatively smoothly in the period 2002-2015: amounting to 13.7% of total
expenditure in 2002, 14.7% of total expenditure in 2009 and 15.2% in 2015. The
6Venema et al. (2009) underline how the high occurrence of work-related health problems in
sectors such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing, is related to the fact that less favorable job
characteristics are more prevalent in these types of sectors, such as manual work and atypical
working hours.
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EU-28 government health expenditure as a share of GDP amounted to 6.2% in 2002
and to 7.2% in 2015. The highest level was in 2009 (7.4% of GDP), at the onset of
the economic crisis, because of a decrease in nominal GDP and not because of an
unusual increase in government expenditure (Eurostat, 2017b).
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the highly debated issue of health ex-
penditure with a theoretical model, combining two strings of the existing literature
about the different impacts of health: higher life expectancy and higher worker pro-
ductivity. We propose an OLG model in the context of a stationary economy, where
the government has to face a trade-off investing into different types of health expendi-
tures:7 it can increase the survival probability (preventive and curative treatments)
or the labor productivity (assistance for disabled workers, laws for better working
spaces, ergonomic interventions to avoid health work related problems listed in Table
3.1). More specifically, the consumption side of the economy consists of households
who reach the retirement phase, given a survival probability. The probability of
surviving depends on the health stock in the economy, which is determined by how
much the government decides to allocate to the first type of health expenditure. The
propensity to save is an increasing function of the survival probability, i.e. of the first
type of health expenditure of the government. Therefore, the more the government
invests to increase the survival probability, the more capital accumulation arises in
the economy. The production side of the economy is characterized just by final
goods production, described by a Cobb-Douglas, where the inputs are capital and
effective labor. The latter input directly depends on the second type of government
health expenditure: the more it invests in the second type of health expenditure,
the more productive the labor force will be. We find the optimal combination of the
tax rate and of the allocation of the tax revenues between the two health policies,
that maximizes the steady state of GDP per worker.
7The Government has different types of health expenditures: curative care; preventive care;
rehabilitative cares; long-term care health; therapeutic appliances and other medical goods (Euro-
stat, 2017b).
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3.2 The model
3.2.1 Households
The consumption side of the economy consists of overlapping generations (Samuel-
son, 1958; Diamond, 1965) with single-sex individuals who live for three time pe-
riods: childhood, adulthood, and retirement. The first period lasts for 20 years
and the other two periods last 40 years each.8 Therefore, the total years of life
are 100. However, adults face a survival probability between adulthood and retire-
ment, that defines the total life expectancy. Children do not make any economic
decisions and they fulfill their consumption through parents expenditures. Adults
consume, save and work in the first period and they only consume in the second
one.9 In the middle of adulthood, each adult gives birth to one child such that the
latter enters adulthood when adults enter the retirement. Given these assumptions
the size of the cohorts will stay constant.10 We assume, the labor force stays con-
stant: Nt = N¯ , ∀t. Compared to part of the existing literature about the impact
of longevity, we completely abstract from the issue of population growth. Zhang
et al. (2001), Doepke (2004), Zhang and Zhang (2005) among others emphasize how
an increase in longevity reduces fertility. In our work, we decide to focus just on
the impact of longevity, i.e. of health, on savings, because we are interested in the
complementary effects of different types of health expenditures affecting longevity
and labor productivity in the economy. Adding the issue of fertility might distract
from our major intent. The probability of surviving to the second period has the
8Also in the theoretical model by Galama et al. (2013), individuals begin working at the age of
20.
9In this paper we do not model the concept of working life expectancy. An interesting approach
is the one by Fanti and Gori (2011): the authors build an OLG framework where the public health
investments affect the labor supply of the old-aged workers. Indeed, according to Eurostat (2017c)
15.9% of EU-28 old-age pensioners continue to work. Of these, 62.8% continue to work mainly for
financial reasons, while 37.2% do so mainly for non-financial reasons, e.g. job satisfaction.
10See Ludwig and Vogel (2010); Baldanzi et al. (2017) for the same structure.
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following specification:11
φ =
γbt
1 + bt
, (3.1)
where bt is the health status of an individual depending on the resources invested
by the government and γ is the medical technology that positively affects the life
expectancy. The survival probability function has the following properties:
• φ(bt) ∈ (0, 1)
• ∂φ(bt)/∂(bt) > 0
• ∂φ2(bt)/∂b2t < 0
Our survival probability follows partly the function suggested by Chakraborty
(2004). Despite of it, the purpose of this paper is different: in his work, the author
focuses on the probability of surviving endogenously determined through public in-
vestment in health, but compared to us, there is no need to focus on the role of
the government or of different types of health expenditures. Indeed, Chakraborty
(2004)’s model relates to developing and underdeveloped countries where high mor-
tality can induce poverty traps because neither savings accumulation nor human
capital accumulation occur. Instead in our model, that fits more the developed
countries, the longevity issue is just one aspect and the government has to allocate
resources among two different types of health expenditures.12
The utility function is13
ut = ln (c1,t) + βφ (bt) ln (c2,t) , (3.2)
11Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) argue that changes in life expectancy owe much to changes
in public awareness and personal lifestyles brought about unintentionally by changes in levels
of education through which human capital is accumulated. Moreover, the survival probability
function can be influenced by a number of other factors as well, both internal and external to an
agent, such as: private expenditures of income, time and effort (e.g., on medical treatment, hygiene
and exercise), government provided services and the quality of the environment (i.e. the extent of
public health care, sanitation and pollution).
12See Age´nor (2012) for different examples of survival probability function.
13Health does not enter directly the utility function, but through the survival probability. See
Van Zon and Muysken (2001) for an example of how health enters the utility through endogenous
preferences.
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where c1,t is first period consumption of the generation born at time t, c2,t is second
period consumption of the generation born at time t and β is the discount factor.
Following Zhang and Zhang (2005), the economy is characterized by an actuarially
fair annuity market that channels savings in physical capital, K, for production in
the next period. With this annuity market, old-age survivors share the savings plus
interest left by households who die before reaching old age.14 The budget constraints
of the households are the following:
c1,t + st = atwt (1− τ) ,
c2,t =
(
Rt+1
φ (bt)
)
st.
The lifetime budget constraint follows:
c1,t +
c2,tφ (bt)
Rt+1
= atwt (1− τ) , (3.3)
where at is the individual labor productivity, wt is the effective wage rate, τ is the
tax rate on households income and R
φ(bt)
is the rate of return to saving, thanks to
the market annuity structure. From the FOCs, we get the Euler Equation:
c2,t
c1,t
= β (Rt+1) . (3.4)
The optimal savings are
s∗t = σatwt (1− τ) , (3.5)
where
σ =
φ (bt) β
1 + φ (bt) β
, (3.6)
is the propensity to save, which is an increasing function of the survival probability
14See also Blackburn and Cipriani (2002); Chakraborty (2004); Irmen (2017) among others for
the same annuity market structure.
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(∂σ/∂φ (bt) > 0):
15 improvements in longevity incentive to invest more in physical
capital. For the same type of reasoning see also: Reinhart (1999); Azomahou et al.
(2009); Leung and Wang (2010); Heijdra and Mierau (2012).16
3.2.2 Production
The production side of the economy is characterized just by final goods production,
described by a Cobb-Douglas, where the inputs are capital and effective labor.
Yt = DK
α
t
(
atN¯
)1−α
, (3.7)
where D is the productivity parameter and α is the elasticity of output with respect
to capital. First-order conditions yield the rental rate of capital
Rt = α
Yt
Kt
, (3.8)
and the effective wage rate
wt = (1− α) Yt
N¯at
. (3.9)
3.2.3 Government
Following Barro (1990), the government has to balance its budget, i.e. it can neither
finance deficits issuing debts nor run surplus accumulating assets.17 In particular,
we assume that government spending is financed contemporaneously by a flat-rate
tax, τ , on household income. The government has to allocate its total revenues,
15Note that the survival probability disappears from the Euler Equation because of the annuity
market and it shows up in the optimal savings.
16In this model, we focus on the savings of young cohorts and not of old cohorts. Actually, studies
concerning savings among people aged more than 65 years do not show clear results (Bloom et al.,
2015a).
17In Barro (1990) the taxation is directly on income, instead of on household income. See Aı´sa
and Pueyo (2006) for an example of government debts for health expenditure.
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τN¯atwt, between two types of health expenditures:
h1t + h
2
t = τN¯atwt. (3.10)
Therefore substituting Equation (3.9)
h1t + h
2
t = τ (1− α)Yt, (3.11)
where
h1t = λτ (1− α)Yt, (3.12)
h2t = (1− λ) τ (1− α)Yt, (3.13)
h1t affects the survival probability, so it represents the investments by the government
that make households live longer (preventive and curative treatments). The health
status, bt, introduced in Equation (3.1), is now characterized by
bt =
h1t
Yt
= λτ (1− α) . (3.14)
The health stock per person, bt, is the health expenditure by the government,
h1t , as a share of GDP, i.e. the health status depends positively on the share of
resources that an economy allocates to the health sector. To see why, consider
Equation (3.14) in this way: bt =
h1t
N¯yt
where yt =
Yt
N¯
is the GDP per worker. It is
straightforward to divide health expenditure by the labor force size N¯ . Indeed, if we
compare two countries, such as India and Luxembourg, the latter one would have
a lower absolute value of health expenditure. However, life expectancy is higher in
Luxembourg than in India. Now consider Equation (3.12) rewritten in the following,
i.e. before substituting the definition of effective wage:
h1t = λτN¯atwt
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Suppose, in the economy the wages per worker, atwt, increase, this will result in a
higher tax revenue, therefore, for a given λ, in a higher h1t . The latter one is used
to pay the health care personnel, doctors and nurses. Since wages increase, also
wages in the health care sector increase, therefore although health care expenditure
will rise, the amount of health treatments and cures will not be affected resulting in
a no-change of health status of individuals. Given the linear relationship between
productivity and GDP per capita, it is convenient to divide h1t by aggregate GDP.
In the theoretical model by Aı´sa and Pueyo (2006), public health services affect the
level of mortality. In particular, they assume that the instantaneous probability
of dying is negatively related to public expenditure in health as a percentage of
the GDP. A similar approach has been used by Schneider and Winkler (2017) and
by Kuhn and Prettner (2016): the authors consider the health expenditure as the
share of labor income because the health care sector is labor intensive. Moreover,
although the focus is on human capital, Strulik et al. (2013) consider the education
expenditure as a share of GDP. Ono and Uchida (2016) refer to pension-to-GDP
ratio and public education-to-GDP ratio in their OLG model.18
Combining Equations (3.6) and (3.14), we can rewrite the saving propensity as:
σ =
(1− α)λβτγ
1 + (1− α)λτ (1 + βγ) . (3.15)
The propensity to save is an increasing function of h1t , i.e. of λτ (∂σ/∂λτ > 0).
Therefore, the more the government invests in h1t , the more capital accumulation
arises in the economy.
The second type of health expenditure, h2t , affects the labor productivity
at =
h2t
Yt
= (1− λ) τ (1− α) . (3.16)
18Also Jones (2002) considers the health expenditure as a share of GDP. Afonso and Furceri
(2010) among others relates the growth rate of GDP per capita with general government expendi-
ture variables as percentage of GDP in their regressions.
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The labor productivity is the health expenditure by the government h2t as a share
of GDP, i.e. the productivity depends positively on the share of resources that an
economy allocates to this type of expenditure. Since the resources needed for this
type of health expenditure are produced also with physical capital and not just with
labor and due to the symmetry of the model, we divide the second health expen-
diture by aggregate GDP too.19 The more the government invests in h2t , the less
work-related health problems occur, therefore less sick leaves and less limitations
in the daily activities of workers: a healthier population usually means also a more
productive labor force (Bloom and Canning, 2005; Cai, 2010; Prettner et al., 2013).
For the work-related health problems, the government can subsidize ergonomic in-
terventions (better chairs and computer screens, better working spaces), it can pay
for doctors and for drugs to solve the specific health problems listed in Table 3.1.
Moreover, it can promote laws to encourage firms to create a healthy working envi-
ronment compatible with a balanced work-life and it can issue environmental laws,
especially in the agricultural and manual sectors. Hence, the production function
becomes:20
Yt = DK
α
t [(1− α) (1− λ) τ ]1−α . (3.17)
3.2.4 Savings-Investment Balance
The asset market clearing condition requires equality between investment and sav-
ings:
It = st. (3.18)
Physical capital fully depreciates in one period in production.
Kt+1 = st. (3.19)
19It is noteworthy that dividing by Yt implies that at is stationary in the steady state and,
thereby, output per capita is also stationary in the steady state.
20From now on, to simplify the notation, we normalize N¯ = 1.
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With Equation (3.5)
Kt+1 = σatwt (1− τ) ,
and with Equations (3.9) and (3.17) the accumulation of capital is:
Kt+1 = σ (1− τ) (1− α)DKαt [(1− λ) (1− α) τ ]1−α .
Since α < 1, the process is stable. The capital stock at the steady state is:
Kss = [Dσ (1− α) (1− τ)] 11−α τ (1− λ) (1− α) , (3.20)
with
σ =
(1− α)λβτγ
1 + (1− α)λτ (1 + βγ) .
3.3 Results
Substituting Equation (3.20) in (3.17), we can derive the steady state of GDP per
worker:
Y ss = [D (1− α)] 11−α
[
(1− α)λβτγ
1 + (1− α)λτ (1 + βγ) (1− τ)
] α
1−α
τ (1− λ) . (3.21)
Looking at Equation (3.21), we can see the impact of τ and λ: τ has a positive im-
pact through σ (see Equation (3.15)) -higher accumulation of savings- and through
τ (1− λ) -more productive labor force- and a negative impact through (1− τ) α1−α ,
the drag-down effect of tax reducing household income.21 We also see the comple-
mentarity of the two health expenditures: if λ = 0, there will not be investments in
the first type of health expenditure, h1t , i.e. no preventive and curative treatments
21See Pautrel (2012) for an interesting analysis of the two opposing effects of the environmental
tax, τ , leading to an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the steady-
state output level.
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that make individuals survive and therefore the saving propensity σ will be equal
to zero, making no accumulation of capital in the economy, and hence no positive
state of the economy; on the other hand, if λ = 1, the government will not invest in
the second type of health expenditure, h2t , i.e. the labor force will not be productive
and there will be no output in the economy, so again no positive steady state of the
economy. Therefore, both types of health expenditures are necessary: each of them
contributes to two different channels, i.e. accumulation of savings and productivity
of the labor force. We implement a simple numerical example with the following
parameters (see Table 3.2). We manage to compute the GDP per worker of the
European Union, exploiting Equation (3.21), i.e. 71939$.22
Table 3.2: Parameter values for the numerical example
Parameter Value Parameter Value
τ 0.4 λ 0.5
β 0.67 α 0.33
γ 4.5 D 14494.4
We choose λ = 0.5, assuming that the government would distribute equally the
tax revenues among the two types of health expenditures.23 Following Heijdra and
Mierau (2010), the tax rate on labor income is equal to 40%. Considering that in our
model the retirement period lasts 40 years and exploiting the survival probability
function (Equation 3.1), we choose γ = 4.5, such that the total life expectancy is
81.13 like in the European Union (World Bank, 2017).24 The discount factor, β, is
computed based on a discount rate equal to 1% from Florio (2007) and considering
the fact that a period lasts for 40 years in our OLG structure.25 The elasticity of
22Since we have normalized the size of the labor force to 1, we can consider GDP per worker
from the data (total GDP over labor force). Our target is the average from 2007-2016 of the GDP
per worker (current US $) of the European Union.
23We decide for this value because data about aggregate government expenditures are faraway
from our model assumption with just two types of health expenditures.
24The total life expectancy is computed in this way: 20 + 40 + 40 ∗ (1−α)γτλ(1+(1−α)τλ) .
25See Zhuang et al. (2007) for a literature review on the measurement of the discount rate and
its estimation.
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output with respect to physical capital α is taken from Mankiw et al. (1992). We
set the productivity parameter D = 14494.4 to get the best fit with data.
3.3.1 Optimal allocation of the resources by the government
In this subsection, we describe the steady state of the economy as a function of the
two government policy instruments. The government has to maximize Y ss choosing
the optimal tax rate and the optimal allocation of the two health expenditures.26
Given the complexity of the function of Equation (3.21),27 it is not possible to show
analytically its concavity (negative definite Hessian matrix), but with numerical
simulations, we show that, despite the variations of parameters, the shape of Y ss is
still concave and the maximizing combination of τ ∗ and λ∗ is always interior.28 The
optimal combination of τ ∗ (∂Y ss/∂τ = 0) and λ∗ (∂Y ss/∂λ = 0) to maximize the
steady state of the economy is:29
τ ∗ =
1− α
1− λ∗α, (3.22)
α
1− α
1− λ∗
(1 + (1− α)λ∗τ ∗ (1 + βγ))
1
λ∗
= 1. (3.23)
We notice that τ ∗ and λ∗ are correlated one with each other, specifically looking at
Equation (3.22) ∂τ ∗/∂λ∗ > 0. The steady state of the GDP at the optimal value is:
Ymax = (D (1− α))
1
1−α (σ∗ (1− τ ∗)) α1−α τ ∗ (1− λ∗) . (3.24)
26Park and Philippopoulos (2004) assume that the allocation of public expenditure is exogenous
and they focus only on the role the tax rate.
27The major problem of the first and second derivatives of Equation (3.21) is how τ and λ
interplay in σ.
28We implemented the numerical simulations in Matlab, plotting Equation (3.21) as a function
of τ and λ. Each parameter has its own vector with 100 values taken from a normal random distri-
bution with mean and standard deviation according to the literature and to the model restrictions
(for example α has mean and deviation standard equal to 0.33 (Mankiw et al., 1992), but all the
100 values of the random vector have to be between 0 and 1).
29A similar result has been reached by Dioikitopoulos (2014) with a different purpose: the author
focuses on the allocation of public funds between health and human capital.
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In Figure 3.2, we represent Equation (3.24) with respect to the policy instruments
τ and λ. We can observe that the steady state of the economy is a concave function
and the optimal combination of the two policy instruments is an interior point.
Figure 3.2: Steady state of the economy, τ ∗ = 0.7246 and λ∗ = 0.2464, Y ∗ =
1.2905e+ 05
3.3.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection we conduct the sensitivity analysis for the parameters γ, β and
α.
D does not play any significant role with respect to the steady state: when it
increases the maximum value of the steady state increases too, without any changes
in τ ∗ and λ∗.30
γ has the following values: 0.2, 1.5 and 4.5 (see Table 3.3). We obtain respectively
30Given the straightforward relationship, we do not report any tables for the sensitivity analysis
of D.
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the following life expectancies: 61, 67 and 79.5.31 γ < 1 follows Chakraborty (2004)
survival probability, indeed we obtain a life expectancy of 61 years old that describes
better the conditions of underdeveloped countries. For γ = 4.5, we obtain a similar
value of life expectancy that we have in our numerical example, despite the different
τ and λ we choose. We observe that increasing the medical technology makes the
optimal value of λ, i.e. the share the government has to invest in medical preventive
and curative treatments, decrease: if the medical technology is large to make the
life expectancy enough high to have sufficient accumulation of capital than the
government has less incentives to invest more resources in the first type of health
expenditure.
β has the following values: 0.30, 0.67 and 0.96. They correspond respectively to
the following discount rates: 0.03 (Nordhaus, 1993), 0.01 (Florio, 2007) and 0.001
(Stern, 2007). As in the numerical example, we transform the annual discount rates
in intergenerational discount rates considering the periods last 40 years. γ and β
have the same role (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4): they increase the maximum value of
the steady state of the economy. Both parameters increase the propensity to save
(∂σ/∂γ > 0 and ∂σ/∂β > 0). The rise in the saving rate leads to a higher amount
of physical capital investment and therefore in a higher steady state of the economy.
α has the following values (see Table 3.5): 0.33 (Mankiw et al., 1992), 0.36 which
is the capital share of income in US in 2011 and 0.42 which is the capital share of
income in Luxembourg in 2012 (OECD, 2018). If alpha increases, capital becomes
relatively more important in the production process. Therefore, the government
will try to increase the amount of capital used. Since the stock of capital depends
on the amount of savings and the savings in turn depend on the savings rate, the
government will try to increase the saving rate. The saving rate depends on the
survival probability. Therefore, for the government it is straightforward to invest
more in longevity than in productivity. Besides, GDP per worker is higher for higher
31The life expectancy has been computed like in the numerical example, but with the optimal
values of τ and λ: (1−α)γτ
∗λ∗
(1+(1−α)τ∗λ∗) .
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levels of α and this is consistent with the real data.
Table 3.3: Sensitivity analysis of γ
Parameters and Variables Values Values Values
α 0.33 0.33 0.33
γ 0.2 1.5 4.5
β 0.67 0.67 0.67
D 14500 14500 14500
τ∗ 0.7427 0.7378 0.7299
λ∗ 0.2967 0.2785 0.2487
Steady state of the economy 32117 82416 129070
Table 3.4: Sensitivity analysis of β
Parameters and Variables Values Values Values
α 0.33 0.33 0.33
γ 4.5 4.5 4.5
β 0.30 0.67 0.96
D 14500 14500 14500
τ∗ 0.7362 0.7299 0.7262
λ∗ 0.2724 0.2487 0.2346
Steady state of the economy 93625 129070 146730
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Table 3.5: Sensitivity analysis of α
Parameters and Variables Values Values Values
α 0.33 0.36 0.42
γ 4.5 4.5 4.5
β 0.67 0.67 0.67
D 14500 14500 14500
τ∗ 0.7246 0.71014 0.666675
λ∗ 0.2464 0.27536 0.31884
Steady state of the economy 129050 186500 437370
3.4 Robustness checks
In this section, we analyze how changing some assumptions of the model impacts
on the results. First, we assume a new survival probability function, to see how
the saving propensity changes and whether or not the optimal policy instruments
change. Second, we change the production function, giving another role to the
second type of health expenditure by the government.
The new survival probability function is
φbis = γb
ξ
t , (3.25)
where γ and ξ belong to (0,1). Substituting the definition of the health status, bt,
the survival probability becomes
φbis = γ ((1− α)λτ)ξ . (3.26)
Therefore the propensity to save is
σbis =
βγ ((1− α) τλ)ξ
1 + βγ ((1− α) τλ)ξ . (3.27)
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The steady state of GDP is still the same
Y ss = [D (1− α)] 11−α
[
βγ ((1− α) τλ)ξ
1 + βγ ((1− α) τλ)ξ (1− τ)
] α
1−α
τ (1− λ) . (3.28)
The steady state of GDP is a concave function of the two optimal policy in-
struments of the government. The optimal taxation rate does not change, it still
depends on the optimal λ:
τ ∗ =
1− α
1− αλ∗ . (3.29)
In Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, we show the steady state of the economy with the survival
probability function (3.28) by varying the parameter ξ.32 We observe that smaller
values of ξ imply smaller values of λ: since the survival probability will increase, the
necessary h1t is smaller.
Figure 3.3: Steady state of the economy, τ ∗ = 0.6787 and λ∗ = 0.0387, Y ∗ = 144390,
ξ = 0.1
32The other parameters have the following values: α = 0.33, D = 14500, γ = 0.5, β = 0.67
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Figure 3.4: Steady state of the economy, τ ∗ = 0.7131 and λ∗ = 0.1831, Y ∗ = 86084,
ξ = 0.5
In a second attempt, we change the production function, keeping the original
survival probability, Equation (3.1).
Yt = aK
α
t N¯
1−α, (3.30)
where a is a productivity parameter, which is financed by the government a =
(1− α) (1− λ) τ . In this case, the health expenditure h2t by the government is a
positive externality for the whole economy and not just for the labor force. Basically,
the health expenditure affect also the use of capital and not just the physical work.
Given the new production function, (3.30), we do not compute the effective wage
rate, but just the wage rate (∂Yt/∂N¯). Despite of it, nothing changes in our analysis,
but the steady state of the GDP
Y ss = N¯ (1− α) 1+α1−α
[
(1− α)λβτγ
1 + (1− α)λτ (1 + βγ) (1− τ)
] α
1−α
(τ (1− λ)) 11−α . (3.31)
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Figure 3.5: Steady state of the economy, τ ∗ = 0.7423 and λ∗ = 0.2950, Y ∗ = 58121,
ξ = 0.9
The shape of the function is still concave with respect to the two policy instruments
τ and λ (see Figure 3.6).33 In this case the optimal taxation rate, τ ∗, is different
compared to (3.22):
τ ∗ =
1
1 + α− αλ∗ . (3.32)
Therefore, we notice that changing the survival probability function changes the
saving propensity but not the maximizing taxation rate. Instead, changing the
production function, that is giving another role to the health expenditure, we have
a different optimal taxation rate. Despite these changes of the assumptions in both
the household side and the production side, both health expenditures are necessary
at the equilibrium of the economy and the steady state of the GDP is still a concave
function of the two policy instruments and the optimal combination of them is
always interior.
33The parameters have the following values: α = 0.33, N¯ = 14500, γ = 4.5, β = 0.67.
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Figure 3.6: Steady state of the economy, τ ∗ = 0.7911 and λ∗ = 0.2000, Y ∗ =
760.8636
3.5 A comparison with Barro (1990)
Suppose we do not divide the h2t by Yt. The production function becomes
Yt = DK
α
t ((1− λ) τ (1− α)Yt)1−α . (3.33)
Therefore:
Yt = D
1
αKt ((1− λ) τ (1− α))
1−α
α . (3.34)
The key assumption is that the production function has constant returns to scale to
government spending and capital together, but it has decreasing returns to scale to
government spending and capital separately. We end up in an AK model framework
like Barro (1990). The associated growth rate of the economy is:
gK = gY = (D (1− α))
1
α σ (1− τ) (τ (1− λ)) 1−αα − 1. (3.35)
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The optimal tax rate is still τ ∗ = (1− α) / (1− λ∗α).
The Barro (1990) model is a breaking point in the literature of public policy and
economic growth interaction. In his seminal work, Barro (1990) suggests a simple
endogenous growth model from Romer (1986) with government. Public investments,
financed through income taxes, are complements to private investments. In the
decentralized economy, the maximizing tax rate of the economy is τBarro = 1− α.34
In our model, the maximizing tax rate is τ ∗ = 1−α
1−λ∗α , which is higher than τBarro for
∀α and ∀λ. This happens because compared to Barro (1990), we have two channels
of government investments: accumulation of savings and labor productivity. Both
of them with diminishing returns increase the output, making it possible to have
a higher tax rate, compared to Barro (1990), where the government has just one
channel of investment. We will have the same result as Barro (1990) if λ = 0, i.e.
there is no investment in the health expenditure that makes you live longer, having
a higher accumulation of capital.
3.6 One policy instrument: λ
To obtain more analytical results, we consider the steady state of GDP per worker
as a function of just one policy instrument: λ - the share of the health expenditure,
considering τ as a parameter. Moreover, this approach can be a more real world
justification: τ is probably more stable than the more specific choice associated with
λ. The GDP per worker at the steady state as a function of λ will be
Y ss = [D (1− α)] 11−α
[
(1− α)λβτγ
1 + (1− α)λτ (1 + βγ) (1− τ)
] α
1−α
τ (1− λ) . (3.36)
34Actually, the maximizing tax rate in Barro (1990) is α, because the production function is
Yt = K
1−α
t G
α
t where G is the public spending. In our model, it is the opposite: the share of public
spending in the production function is 1−α (see Equations (3.7) and (3.33)) Therefore, to compare
with the Barro (1990) model, we have to assume that the τBarro is 1− α.
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The optimal value of λ is
λ∗ =
√
1 + 4α (1− α)2 τ (1 + βγ)− 1
2 (1− α)2 τ (1 + βγ) . (3.37)
Also in this case the function is concave with respect to the policy instrument λ.35
3.6.1 Sensitivity analysis
As in Section 3.3.2, we implement a sensitivity analysis. We keep the same values
for γ, β, α.
γ, β, α have the same impact on λ and on the GDP per worker at the steady state
like in the case of two policy instruments (see 3.3.2). For τ we choose 0.05, 0.4
and 0.7.36 If τ increases, λ decreases. Since h2 contributes directly to the increase
in income, Y , for the government it is more convenient to invest more into labor
productivity, to have a higher income to tax.
Table 3.6: Sensitivity analysis of γ
Parameters and Variables Values Values Values
α 0.33 0.33 0.33
γ 0.2 1.5 4.5
β 0.67 0.67 0.67
D 14500 14500 14500
τ 0.4 0.4 0.4
λ∗ 0.31038 0.29803 0.27534
Steady state of the economy 20029 52384 84595
35See the Appendix.
36We choose also τ = 0.7, because in the previous sensitivity analysis, we obtained that value as
the optimal one.
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Table 3.7: Sensitivity analysis of β
Parameters and Variables Values Values Values
α 0.33 0.33 0.33
γ 4.5 4.5 4.5
β 0.30 0.67 0.96
D 14500 14500 14500
τ 0.4 0.4 0.4
λ∗ 0.29364 0.27534 0.26362
Steady state of the economy 59887 84595 97542
Table 3.8: Sensitivity analysis of α
Parameters and Variables Values Values Values
α 0.33 0.36 0.9
γ 4.5 4.5 4.5
β 0.67 0.67 0.67
D 14500 14500 14500
τ 0.4 0.4 0.4
λ∗ 0.2753 0.3005 0.3527
Steady state of the economy 84594 125493 308974
Table 3.9: Sensitivity analysis of τ
Parameters and Variables Values Values Values
α 0.33 0.33 0.33
γ 4.5 4.5 4.5
β 0.67 0.67 0.67
D 14500 14500 14500
τ 0.05 0.4 0.7
λ∗ 0.32072 0.27534 0.25071
Steady state of the economy 5355.1 84595 128552
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3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we combine two different meanings of being healthy: living longer and
working better. In addition, we point out the importance of health expenditures,
that nowadays are at the center of many political debates (see for example The
Economist (2017)). Compared to the existing literature that focuses more on the
quantity of life, especially at the macro level, we describe the aspect of the quality
of life, in particular the health of the labor force. Indeed nowadays, in developed
countries where the life expectancy at 65 has increased dramatically (World Bank,
2017), the concept of the quality of life should be taken into consideration by the
economic literature. Since the working life expectancy is increasing, being healthy
at work and having a good work-life balance is the first step to tackle the challenges
on the European labor market (Eurofound, 2017). We set up an OLG framework, in
which health makes households live longer, therefore accumulation of savings occurs,
and it makes households work better, hence production in the economy increases.
To have positive GDP at the steady state both health expenditures are necessary.
We show that the government, given an amount of resources, has a trade-off between
two types of health expenditures and we find the optimal tax rate and the optimal
allocations of its revenues. Besides, we check that changing the survival proba-
bility function and the final goods production function, both health expenditures
are still necessary and there exists an optimal combination of the allocation of the
government revenues and of the tax rate. As shown in the sensitivity analysis (see
Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5), the values of λ, the share of the government revenues in-
vested in the first type of health expenditure, i.e. preventive and curative treatment,
are low compared to the share of the government revenues invested in the second
type of health expenditure. These results do not only emphasize the importance
of the health status at work but they should also encourage future theoretical as
well as empirical research, to better understand the interactions between different
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types of health expenditures and their economic consequences. According to us, the
next step should be a vintage growth model where the health status of households
changes with the passage of time and impacts differently on the economy. Another
issue might be the combination of private and public expenditures for the first type
of health (preventive and curative treatment). To focus on the trade-off of the two
health expenditures, we abstract from these aspects that will characterize a more
realistic setting but which will make the model analytically more complicated. We
consider these aspects promising suggestions for future research.
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3.8 Appendix
The first derivative of Y ss wrt λ is
∂Y ss
∂λ
= [D (1− α)] 11−α τ
[
(1− α)λβτγ
1 + (1− α)λτ (1 + βγ) (1− τ)
] α
1−α
∗
∗
[(
α
1− α
)
1− λ
(λ+ (1− α)λ2τ (1 + βγ)) − 1
]
.
With ∂Y
ss
∂λ
= 0, we obtain
(1− α)2 λ2τ (1 + βγ) + λ− α = 0.
For the rule of the roots (+ + -), the previous equation has two solutions: one
positive and one negative. Since λ ∈ (0, 1), we accept only the positive solution:
λ∗ =
√
1 + 4α (1− α)2 τ (1 + βγ)− 1
2 (1− α)2 τ (1 + βγ) .
The second derivative is
∂2Y ss
∂λ2
= [D (1− α)] 11−α τ
[
(1− α)λβτγ
1 + (1− α)λτ (1 + βγ) (1− τ)
] α
1−α
∗
∗[
(
α
1− α
)2
1− λ
[λ+ (1− α)λ2τ (1 + βγ)]2 −
(
α
1− α
)
1
[λ+ (1− α)λ2τ (1 + βγ)] +
+
α
1− α
− [λ+ (1− α)λ2τ (1 + βγ)]− [1 + 2 (1− α)λτ (1 + βγ)] (1− λ)
[λ+ (1− α)λ2τ (1 + βγ)]2 ]
The first line is positive, hence it does not change the sign of the derivative. In the
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squared parenthesis the first term is positive and the other two are negative.
If | ( α
1−α
)2 1−λ
[λ+(1−α)λ2τ(1+βγ)]2 |<| −
(
α
1−α
)
1
[λ+(1−α)λ2τ(1+βγ)] +
α
1−α
−[λ+(1−α)λ2τ(1+βγ)]−[1+2(1−α)λτ(1+βγ)](1−λ)
[λ+(1−α)λ2τ(1+βγ)]2 |, then the derivative is negative and the
function is concave.
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